Taking up the Gauntlet: Cities as a challenge to federalism theory
Massey Cities Summit Session: Cities and Multilevel Governance
Patricia Popelier
Constitutional theory and practice are blind to the new ‘century of the city’ (Hirschl 2020). Federalism theory in particular is under attack. Some find it inadequate and in need of re-thinking (Weinstock 2014); others suggest to replace it altogether (Blank 2010; Gussen 2019).
We should take this opportunity to rethink a theory that has been under attack for other reasons as well, rather than simply do away with it. To understand the position of cities, we need an encompassing theory that covers the entire structure of each unit of government and the political system as a whole. Federalism has this potential, whereas subsidiarity, to which is referred as a replacement (Blank 2010; Gussen 2019) does not. We also need a theory that focuses on more than cities alone. Gussen’s vision that “by the end of this century, cities will replace nation-states as the dominant polity in a new world system” (Gussen 2019: 3) is still science fiction: in the meantime, cities are part of more global multi-level systems of governance.
Dynamic federalism offers a renewed federalism theory that addresses any level of authority (Popelier 2021). Its starting position is that all political systems that disperse public policy powers over different levels of authority seek a balance between cohesion and autonomy. These are not opposites. Cohesion does not mean centrality; it aims to secure the integrity of the entire system by linking all tiers through mutual respect, common interest and solidarity (Sahadžić 2020).
What the proper balance between cohesion and autonomy is, is context-bound and forms part of a political understanding. It is also a constitutionally defined and contested concept. ‘Constitutionally defined’ means that the political agreement is reflected in institutional arrangements. ‘Contested’ refers to the many forces that push for (formal and informal) changes to these power relations.
Dynamic federalism is prescriptive and explanatory: it makes no normative claims. Advocates of a ‘governance of cities’ claim stronger constitutional status for cities. Dynamic federalism merely registers their position and examines the dynamics this creates between different levels of government. At the same time, it overcomes the weaknesses of traditional federal theory that hinder a more prominent role for cities.
Cities are mostly absent in traditional federal theory, it is argued, because states are considered the only truly recognized territorial entity (Blank 2010). One could propose upgrading cities to the level of the state. This nuances Hirschl’s (2020) contention that in Europe none of the major cities, including Brussels, enjoy meaningful constitutional status: the Brussels metropolitan area, including 19 closely linked municipalities, coincides with the Brussels Region, which is a state in the Belgian federation. This solution, however, does not suffice: it disregards the role of cities in unitary systems, and does not solve the need for a multilevel approach.
By contrast, dynamic federalism takes a multilevel approach. It develops indexes to measure cohesion and autonomy in the relation between any central authority and any other unit. This way, territorial entities within and across country borders can be compared, regardless of their label within the constitutional system. Such comparative exercises over time would reveal the dynamics that come with the coexistence of different levels of authority. For example, it has been noticed that municipal decentralization is sometimes used to curb the position of regional authorities (Dickovick 2006, Kincaid 2015).
Next, the fact that cities have a very distinct character, sits uneasy with traditional federal theory. This theory recommends constitutional symmetry – the same status and powers for all states, irrespective of size, population, history or economic condition - as a device for stability (Bauböck 2001). By contrast, dynamic federalism offers tools to measure and compare asymmetry and to observe the dynamics that asymmetry entails. For dynamic federalism, giving privileged status to cities only is not a big deal.
Third, traditional federalism is reproached for being mainly focused on so-called ‘negative autonomy’: the protection of constituent units from federal intervention. Instead, a more positive attitude of mutual assistance and coordination among the various levels of government is required (Black 2015). Dynamic federalism is essentially about that: it defines forms of state on the basis of the proportion of cohesion and autonomy. It forces the federalism research agenda to examine how institutional design and federal practices foster or weaken cohesion, in its various forms, including mechanisms for inclusive decision-making, coordination and solidarity.
Lastly, city-governance proponents hold that in traditional federal theory, foreign affairs is an exclusive federal power, whereas local and trans-local action is important to address major challenges such as climate change. By contrast, dynamic federalism does not assign policy domains to specific levels of authority. Instead, it measures autonomy and cohesion of any territorial unit in its relation with a more central, national or supranational, level of authority. From a dynamic federalism perspective, it is perfectly conceivable that cities are included in negotiations, or involved in the approval procedure, in particular if these treaties impact on them.
The emergence of cities emphasizes the need to make federalism theory dynamic. It is too early to consign federalism theory to the wastebin. A theory rooted in century-long constitutional thinking is flexible enough to address the challenges of our time.
Register for this session on April 8th, 10:30 A.M. EST
Bauböck, E. (2001) ‘United in Misunderstanding? Asymmetry in Multinational Federations’, ICE Working Paper series, no. 26 (2001)
Blank, Y. (2010) ‘Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of Global Multilevel Governance’ 37 Fordham Urb. L.J. 509-558
Dickovic, J.T. (2006) ‘Municipalization as Central Government Strategy: Central-Regional-Local Politics in Peru, Brazil, and South Africa’ 37 Publius: the Journal of Federalism 1-25
Gussen, B. (2019) Axial Shift. City Subsidiarity and the World System in the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan)
Hirschl, R. (2020) City, State. Constitutionalism and the Megacity (Oxford University Press 2020)
Kincaid, J. (2015) ‘The rise and characteristics of coercive federalism in the United States’, in Giancarlo Pola (ed.), Principles and Practices of Fiscal Autonomy (Ashgate - reissue Routledge 2017)
Popelier, P. (2021) Dynamic Federalism. A New Theory for Cohesion and Regional Autonomy (Routledge)
Sahadžić, M. (2020) Asymmetry, Multinationalism and Constitutional Law: Managing Legitimacy and Stability in Federalist States (Routledge)
Weinstock, D. (2014) ‘Cities and Federalism’ 55 NOMOS: American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy 259-290.